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Misconceptions about energy conservation abound due to the gap
between physics and secondary school chemistry. This paper surveys
this difference and its relevance to the 1690s-2010s Leibnizian argu-
ment that mind-body interaction is impossible due to conservation
laws.
Justifications for energy conservation are partly empirical, such as
Joule’s paddle wheel experiment, and partly theoretical, such as La-
grange’s statement in 1811 that energy is conserved if the potential
energy does not depend on time. In 1918 Noether generalized results
like Lagrange’s and proved a converse: symmetries imply conserva-
tion laws and vice versa. Conservation holds if and only if nature is
uniform.
The rise of field physics during the 1860s-1920s implied that en-
ergy is located in particular places and conservation is primordially
local: energy cannot disappear in Cambridge and reappear in Lincoln
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instantaneously or later; neither can it simply disappear in Cambridge
or simply appear in Lincoln. A global conservation law can be inferred
in some circumstances.
Einstein’s General Relativity, which stimulated Noether’s work, is
another source of difficulty for conservation laws. As is too rarely real-
ized, the theory admits conserved quantities due to symmetries of the
Lagrangian, like other theories. Indeed General Relativity has more
symmetries and hence (at least formally)more conserved energies. An
argument akin to Leibniz’s finally gets some force.
While the mathematics is too advanced for secondary school, the
ideas that conservation is tied to uniformities of nature and that en-
ergy is in particular places, are accessible. Improved science teaching
would serve the truth and enhance the social credibility of science.
Key words: conservation laws, mental causation, energy, unifor-
mity of nature, locality, symmetries
1 Introduction
The idea is that any causal interaction between mind and
matter would violate the principle of the conservation of
energy.. . . So much the worse, it seems, for interactionism.
(Though traditional, the argument is still current; for ex-
ample, Dennett endorses it (1991, pp. 34-5).)
This argument is flawed. . . .
In short, physicalists need to be wary of bad reasons
to think physicalism is true, arising from naivety about
physics. [Butterfield, 1997, pp. 146, 147]
The conservation of energy is a topic that has frequently arisen over
the centuries within the philosophy of mind, often as an objection to
broadly Cartesian mental causation. This paper will briefly summarize
the history of this objection [Pitts, 2020b] before exploring features
of conservation laws as presently understood by physicists but not
widely known among philosophers. This argument, due to Leibniz in
the 17th century and often repeated until today, begs the question
[Pitts, 2019, Cucu and Pitts, 2019]. That point has certainly been
made before, both in modern times [Averill and Keating, 1981] and in
the 18th century, but not with full mathematical detail on conservation
laws, it seems.
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It has been noticed recently that General Relativity finally gives
this kind of argument a measure of force [Pitts, 2020a]. How secondary
school treatments of conservation laws might be improved without the
need advanced mathematics or logic will then be explored, as will the
reasons that these improvements are important.
2 Mental Causation and/or Conserva-
tion Laws, 1690s-1760s
As early as the 1690s Leibniz publicly deployed his understanding of
conservation laws for momentum (due to Wallis, Wren and Huygens
[Hugens, 1669, Wallis, 1668, Wren, 1668]) and his own proposed law
of the conservation of living force (vis viva), an ancestor of energy,
as reasons to reject Cartesian soul-to-body causation [Leibniz, 1997,
Leibniz, 1969, Leibniz, 1981, Leibniz, 1985, Pitts, 2020b]. In the
Theodicy he puts the matter thusly:
. . . two important truths . . . have been discovered since M.
Descartes’ day. The first is . . . [conservation of mv2, not
|v|.] The second discovery . . . [involves directionality: mo-
mentum ~p = m~v is a vector.] If this rule had been known
to M. Descartes,. . . I believe that that would have led di-
rect [sic] to the Hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony,
whither these same rules have led me. For apart from the
fact that the physical influence of one of these substances
on the other is inexplicable, I recognized that without a
complete derangement of the laws of Nature the soul could
not act physically upon the body. [Leibniz, 1985, p. 156]
Leibniz was of course taking on board scientific progress in speaking of
a conserved momentum vector rather than Descartes’s conservation of
quantity of motion (volume · speed). Whether Leibniz’s conservation
of vis viva, proportional to mass and the square of speed, was right
was unclear till the 19th century.
It is unclear whether Descartes wanted the conservation of motion
to hold even in the presence of mental causation and exploited his
directionless conservation of motion to that end (as Leibniz claims).
Apparently he never said this [Remnant, 1979, Garber, 1983]. “The
overwhelming impression that one gets from the texts is that Descartes
just was not very concerned about reconciling his interactionism with
3
his conservation law.” [Garber, 1983] Indeed
there is reason to believe that Descartes may never have
been committed to the position that his conservation law
holds universally and may have allowed for the possibility
that animate bodies lie outside the scope of the laws that
govern inanimate nature. [Garber, 1983]
In any case some Cartesians did hold this view [Woolhouse, 1986]
[Schmaltz, 2008, pp. 172, 173], making it a view worth consideration
and critique.
Whereas in the last 170-odd years many have used Leibniz’s ar-
gument as a reason to deny the existence of souls altogether in favor
of materialism, Leibniz took dualism for granted but denied the soul-
body interaction posited by Descartes. One might almost say that
soul-body interaction was also motivated by common sense. Everyone
is familiar with eating more (say) pizza because one likes the taste; it
seems that the pizza causes a taste experience enjoyed by the mind,
which then causes bodily motions to put more pizza into the mouth,
which gives pleasure to the mind, etc.: iterated body-to-soul and soul-
to-body causation. Or consider more elementary experiences. If I de-
cide to raise my arm, my arm goes up. If I stub my toe on a rock,
then I feel pain. These seem to be examples of mental-to-physical
causation and physical-to-mental causation, respectively. Leibniz’s
own “machine” or “mill” argument seems to undermine physicalism
[Rescher, 1991, section 17]: no understanding of how mechanical parts
interact gives one the least idea of how “perception” occurs, as one
realizes by imagining examining the workings of a scaled-up version
of the machine. But Leibniz introduced the dualist non-interactionist
idea of “pre-established harmony,” according to which there is mental-
to-mental causation and physical-to-physical causation but no inter-
action between the two realms; there is only a divinely orchestrated
harmony between the two.1 Thus if I stub my toe, the pain is not
caused by my toe-stubbing, but by some (secret?) prior mental cause.
If I decide to raise my arm and my arm goes up, the arm-rising is not
caused by my decision to raise my arm, but by some (secret?) physical
cause. Thus as far as causation in the created realm is concerned, our
1One might think that God’s creating the world with this harmony includes a case of
mental-to-physical causation if God is a mind or is relevantly like one and yet creates mat-
ter. Leibniz seemed not to find God’s creating the world objectionable [Alexander, 1956,
pp. 75, 76].
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mental lives could happen in exactly the same way if there were no
physical world, and the physical world could happen in exactly the
same way if we had no mental lives. The former point was viewed
by critics as an objection in that it made God’s creating the physical
world pointless, far from having the sufficient reason that all of God’s
actions were claimed by Leibniz to have. The latter point is more
closely related to various contemporary philosophical debates.
How does Leibniz’s argument from causation serve some contem-
porary purposes? In the early-mid 18th century the three plau-
sible views on the market were broadly Cartesian interactionism,
Malebranche’s occasionalism, and Leibniz-Wolff pre-established har-
mony. Occasionalism held that there is no causal influence from finite
minds (such as ours) to the physical world; only God, an infinite
mind, could act on the physical world, because it would be impos-
sible for God’s willings not to come true. In the 19th century the
idea of epiphenomenalism arose due to Huxley: there is physical-
to-mental causation but not mental-to-physical. Epiphenomenalism
can be (but need not be) a form of substance dualism. Contempo-
rary uses of Leibniz’s anti-interactionist argument usually takes for
granted that interactionist dualism is the only philosophically plau-
sible form of dualism. If interactionist dualists are not all that com-
mon today (though there seems to be a recent increase in respect
for the view [Lycan, 2009, Lycan, 2013, Lycan, 2018]), proponents of
pre-established harmony, occasionalism, and substance dualist epiphe-
nomenalism are far rarer, so this belief about the relatively greater
plausibility of interactionist dualism seems uncontroversial today—in
marked contract to France in 1700 or Germany in 1730. Thus Leibniz’s
anti-interactionist argument serves as an ostensibly scientific subargu-
ment that refutes substance dualism by refuting interactionism, the
most plausible version. His anti-interactionist argument, if success-
ful, also refutes the possible view of interactionist property dualism,
that there are mental properties (but no mental substance) and these
properties can act2 on the physical world [Searle, 2004, pp. 44-46]
[Zimmerman, 2007, Crane, 2001, pp. 40, 43, 50].
2That is, act non-redundantly. In contrast to the 18th century debate (to my knowl-
edge), the current debate entertains the conceptual possibility of mental causation that
makes something happen that physical causation would have made to happen anyway.
Thus nowadays it is possible to affirm mental causation without the mind’s making any
real difference. This conceptual possibility is often rejected by denying that there is sys-
tematic overdetermination.
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3 Some 18th Century Physicists’ Im-
plicit Views: Newton and Euler
Leibniz’s argument faced serious opposition, whether tacit or ex-
plicit, in the 18th century; while Leibnizian pre-established harmony
gained the upper hand in Germany for a while, eventually interac-
tionism recovered as the dominant view even there [Watkins, 1995a,
Watkins, 1998, Watkins, 1995b, Priestly, 1777, p. 64]. This opposi-
tion included not only some very good philosophers such as Crusius
and Knutzen in Germany, but also, one can argue, at least implicitly
the two best physicists of the eras of Leibniz and Wolff, namely, New-
ton and Euler [Pitts, 2020b]. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find
either Newton or Euler explicitly addressing Leibniz’s argument, but
it seems clear what they thought or should have thought given what
they did say.
Newton’s unpublished work often showed his belief in mental force,
as in a draft of Opticks :
Seeing therefore the variety of motion (wch we see) in the
world is always decreasing, there is a necessity of conserving
& recruiting it by active principles; such as are (the power
of life &Will by which animals move their bodies with great
& lasting force;) [McGuire, 1968, pp. 169, 170, bracketed
and cancelled]
Newton in fact quite frequently affirmed strong views of mental cau-
sation [Dempsey, 2006]. He seems not to have been worried by the
idea of conservation law failure due to mental force.3 It is quite ob-
3One might think that a Newtonian could appeal to Newton’s laws for reasoning in
support of exact and exceptionless conservation laws. (I thank Shaul Katzir for this
suggestion.) Such a move might be even more appealing today than it was for historical
Newtonians. The third and especially fourth rules of reasoning are relevant. The fourth
rule says:
In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induc-
tion should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding
any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions
either more exact or liable to exceptions.
This rule should be followed so that arguments based on induction may not
be nullified by hypotheses. [Newton, 1999, p. 442]
I suggest that Newton’s fourth rule gives two different potential escape routes for the in-
teractionist. One possible loophole for the interactionist is to say that the non-conservation
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vious that momentum conservation fails due to lack of the action-
reaction otherwise guaranteed by Newton’s third law of motion. If
the mind exerts some influence on the body, almost certainly the
body does not exert an equal and opposite force on the mind—it
is not at all clear what such a claim could even mean—so momentum
is not conserved. While I am not aware of Newton’s explicitly ad-
dressing Leibniz’s argument, it is quite evident what he should have
thought about it: one should simply accept non-conservation of mo-
mentum due to mental force. Non-conservation of energy (or rather
its ancestor vis viva, mv2) was already accepted by Newton and many
others because of inelastic collisions, so momentum (non)conservation
would be the only serious question for a Newtonian. Relatedly, in
the 18th century the vis viva controversy raged over the proper mea-
sure of force: whereas the conservation of momentum and the con-
servation of energy now are seen as complementary, in that era it
was thought that there should be a “true measure of force,” which
was conserved in physical interactions [Clarke, 1727, Hankins, 1965,
Laudan, 1968, Iltis, 1970, Iltis, 1971, Gale, Jr., 1973, Heimann, 1977,
Papineau, 1977, Terrall, 2004, Smith, 2006, Rey, 2018]. The conser-
vation of momentum was accepted on both sides—one notes that it
follows immediately from Newton’s second and third laws of motion—
but the conservation of vis viva was a controversial claim allied to
claims that vis viva was the true measure of force.
Leibniz’s argument seems to have been equally unimpressive to
Leonhard Euler. If Newton was the dominant physicist of the late
17th century, Euler was similarly dominant in the mid-18th century.
He was one of the greatest mathematicians of all time and the most
prolific. His work on mechanics, fluids, optics, and acoustics makes it
reasonable to call him a physicist avant le lettre. The Euler-Lagrange
equations are crucial in theoretical physics to this day. Euler also dis-
covered/invented the mathematics of local conservation laws, which
are appropriate for continuous media (fluids and solids, and to some
degree modern fields, as opposed to particles), namely the continu-
ity equation, which involves partial derivatives with respect to time
is small and hence compatible with conservation’s being “very nearly true” even if incom-
patible with its being true [van Strien, 2015, Butterfield, 1997, pp. 146, 147]. Another,
perhaps more promising loophole is to argue that other phenomena making conservation
liable to exceptions are known or highly plausible, namely, mental causation. Newton’s
own above-cited views on mental causation [Dempsey, 2006, McGuire, 1968, pp. 169, 170]
indicate that he might well have agreed with the invocation of the second loophole.
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and space [Euler, 1757]. Euler took the conservation of energy (vis
viva) to be not generically true on account of inelastic collisions
[Euler, 1746, Calinger, 2016]. Euler was a staunch interactionist du-
alist [Euler, 1926, Euler, 1752] and a vigorous opponent of Leibniz-
Wolff pre-established harmony [Euler, 1840, I Letts. 79-115, II Letts.
1-17] and of monads [Broman, 2012]. He was an orthodox Christian
and occasionally an apologist [Euler, 1840, Euler, 1965, Arana, 1994,
Breidert, 2007, Knobloch, 2010, Drozdek, 2010, Knobloch, 2018]. As
such he can hardly have failed to notice that mental influence the
physical violated conservation of momentum; evidently he just didn’t
care. Euler could not have been the stout opponent of pre-established
harmony and staunch interactionist that he was, as well as being
the best physicist in the world, without having an informed opin-
ion about the quite popular Leibniz-Wolff conservation argument.
In short, the Leibnizian conservation objection, while holding the
upper hand in Germany for a season, was opposed by great physi-
cists implicitly and good philosophers explicitly during the 18th cen-
tury and was driven back, with interactionism regaining the upper
hand [Watkins, 1995a, Watkins, 1998, Watkins, 1995b, Priestly, 1777,
p. 64].
4 Conservation of Vis Viva/Energy
Revived
Various factors led to the revival of the conservation of vis viva/energy
from the end of the 18th to the middle of the 19th century
[Chang, 2013, Smith, 1998]. Some empirical inputs included Count
Rumford’s experiments on heat from boring of cannon and Sir
Humphrey Davy’s melting ice by friction [Joule, 1850]. The fall of
the caloric theory of heat opened the door for the mechanical equiva-
lent of heat, putting empirical quantitative flesh on the old proposal
that motion lost due to friction (such as from rubbing one’s hands
together vigorously) is still motion, but now of insensibly small par-
ticles. Joule found the mechanical equivalent of heat using a paddle
wheel experiment [Joule, 1846, Joule, 1845, Joule, 1850, Young, 2015].
Helmholtz articulated a broad theoretical basis for conservation
[von Helmholtz, 1847]. Thus the conservation of energy was revived
apparently for good. There were many basically simultaneous partial
discoverers including Mayer as well [Kuhn, 1959, Cahan, 2012]. For
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the moment I omit what one might retrospectively call ‘high’ theo-
retical physics (the least action principle, the symmetry-conservation
link, and local field theory), much of which was the province of math-
ematicians’ analytical mechanics in that era and was not considered
generally applicable.
It was not long before the Leibnzian energy conservation ob-
jection to vitalism and to interactionist dualism (most obviously
to soul-to-body causal influence) was revived during the 1860s-
80s by Helmholtz and Du Bois-Reymond [von Helmholtz, 1861,
Wegener, 2009, van Strien, 2015]. Such authors argued for the re-
ducibility of physiology to physics, which would exclude vital or men-
tal forces. One type of response by vitalists and interactionist dual-
ists involved almost-conservation. As Maxwell, Stewart, Cournot, and
Saint-Venant pointed out in various ways, the delicate construction of
life made possible mental or vital influence on the physical with only
the tiniest non-conservation [van Strien, 2015]. By analogy to firing
a gun, sailing a ship, or controlling a locomotive, a human decision
can launch with control the bullet, ship or train without the mind’s
supplying most of the energy to move the bullet, ship or locomotive;
the mind simply makes a small exertion that directs the release of a
large amount of physically or chemically stored potential energy. Thus
interactionist dualism (or interactionism) is at least compatible with
the evidence for conservation, which is never perfect, even if incom-
patible with strict conservation. An alternative view combined exact
conservation and indeterminism [van Strien, 2015]. While the latter
view has a certain elegance, it is harder to see whether it can work.
Thus in the 19th century the conservation of energy resurfaced with a
new name and on better grounds, now integrated into thermodynam-
ics at the phenomenological level and gradually tied to symmetries
and the principle of least action at the theoretical level.
5 Leibniz’s Argument Against Inter-
actionism Revived
Did the vindication of the conservation of energy also vindicate
Leibniz’s argument against interactionism? At least sociologically
it seemed to do so: the Leibnizian argument reasoning played a
role in psychology from the 19th century onwards [Marshall, 1982,
Daston, 1982, Heidelberger, 2004, Wegener, 2009]. This was not in-
9
evitable on physical grounds: the implicit Newtonian view that mo-
mentum is not conserved due to mental causation (while vis viva is not
conserved on more general physical grounds) could easily have been
updated to a view that both momentum and energy are not conserved
due to mental causation. While such a view has been taken by some,
the argument from conservation laws against mind-body interaction
has continued to inspire confidence within analytic philosophy to this
day. According to Dan Dennett,
the conservation of energy. . . accounts for the physical im-
possibility of ‘perpetual motion machines,’ and the same
principle is apparently violated by dualism. This con-
frontation between quite standard physics and dualism. . . is
widely regarded as the inescapable and fatal flaw of dual-
ism. [Dennett, 1991, p. 35]
According to Mario Bunge,
Dualism violates conservation of energy. If immaterial
mind could move matter, then it would create energy; and if
matter were to act on immaterial mind, then energy would
disappear. In either case energy—a property of all—and
only concrete things would fail to be conserved. And so
physics, chemistry, biology, and economics would collapse.
Faced with a choice between these “hard” sciences and
primitive superstition, we opt for the former. [Bunge, 1980,
p. 17]
Unfortunately Bunge’s catastrophe is short on argument; the solutions
(exact or approximate) of partial differential equations in physics are
typically fairly robust and tolerant of external sources [Jackson, 1975]
without yielding catastrophic instabilities. Another proponent of the
Leibnizian energy conservation objection is Paul Churchland:
[non-epiphenomenalist] . . . forms of Dualism do fly in the
face of basic Physics itself, a rather more damning matter
[than flying “in the face of the constituting convictions of
Folk Psychology and the explanatory practices they sus-
tain”], since any position that includes non-physical ele-
ments in the causal dynamics of the brain must violate
both the law that energy is neither created nor destroyed,
and the law that the total momentum in any closed system
is always conserved. In short, you simply can’t get a change
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in any aspect of the physical brain (for that would causally
require both energy changes and momentum changes) save
by a compensatory change in some other physical aspect of
the brain, which will thereby lay claim to being the cause
at issue. There is simply no room in a physical system for
ghosts of any kind to intervene in some fashion to change its
dynamical behavior. Any physical system is ‘dynamically
closed’ under the laws of Physics. (Indeed, it was this very
difficulty, over a century ago, that motivated the desperate
invention, by Thomas Huxley, of Epiphenomenalism in the
first place.) [Churchland, 2011]
In short, this sort of argument is widely accepted [Morowitz, 1987]
[Pollock, 1989, p. 19] [Flanagan, 1991, p. 21] [Fodor, 1998, p. 64]
[McGinn, 1999, p. 92] [van Inwagen, 2009, p. 246] [Searle, 2004,
p. 42] [Lycan, 2011] [Westphal, 2016, pp. 41-44] (and more in lists
in ([Montero, 2006, Collins, 2008, Gibb, 2010, Pitts, 2019])). While
many or most of those presenting this sort of argument are natu-
ralists, presumably the acquiescence in the conservation of energy is
intended as a submission to a scientific fact (a fact that provides con-
firmation for naturalistic philosophy) rather than as an assertion of
naturalistic philosophy. A mere assertion of naturalistic philosophy
would be dialectically inappropriate in an argument against interac-
tionist dualism. A scientific fact, on the other hand, would fit the bill
nicely.
While interactionist dualism has been a minority view in recent
decades, a large part of this minority (or its sympathizers such as
C. D. Broad) has responded to this objection by denying any in-
compatibility between such mental causation and conservation laws
[Broad, 1937, Gibb, 2010, White, 2017]. Presumably these philoso-
phers also take the acquiescence in the conservation of energy as a
submission to a scientific fact rather than as a mere assertion of natu-
ralistic philosophy. These philosophers often are not naturalists; while
Broad was no theist, his acceptance of parapsychology/spiritualism
[Broad, 1937, Broad, 1953, Broad, 1962] at least involves the existence
of spirits and their influence on the physical world. There would be
little point in conceding that naturalism is true when one actually
takes it to be false. But accepting scientific facts would be quite ap-
propriate.
In an important respect Dennett, Bunge and Churchland are cor-
rect: the conservation laws and interactionist dualist mental causation
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are indeed basically incompatible.4 In this sense the anti-dualists are
closer to the mark. The greater logical strength of local, as opposed to
merely global, conservation laws5 leaves no room for hiding the soul’s
influence by, e.g., compensation by the opposite amount of energy
elsewhere.
Probably both of these groups are motivated by a view that the
conservation of energy (and perhaps likewise the conservation of mo-
mentum) is a scientific fact of the form that energy can be neither
created nor destroyed. While the modal force of “can” could be dis-
cussed, there is at least the implication that in the actual world, energy
is neither created nor destroyed.
6 Responses to Leibniz’s Argument
Ladyman et al. have warned us, however, that not everything aiming
to be naturalistic metaphysics (in the sense of respecting science) is
altogether successful.
We might thus say that whereas naturalistic metaphysics
ought to be a branch of the philosophy of science, much
metaphysics that pays lipservice to naturalism is really phi-
losophy of A-level chemistry. [Ladyman et al., 2007, p. 24]
Is the conservation issue another example where A-level (advanced sec-
ondary school) chemistry is assumed in a context where the difference
with graduate-level physics is significant?
Unfortunately the answer is “yes.” The former (anti-interactionist)
view is a reasonably accurate grasp of what it would be like for the con-
servation laws to hold fully, but fails to recognize that the symmetry-
conservation law link enshrined in Noether’s theorem (on which more
below) imposes on them a burden to argue that the conservation laws
are true—not just close approximations or true in most places and
times (which no dualist should deny), but exactly true everywhere and
always including brains. Consequently the argument assumes what
4Subtle forms of reconciliation might avoid a contradiction while giving up much of
what one expect an interactionist position to involve [Lowe, 2003].
5This statement assumes for simplicity that the local laws can be integrated to give a
global law, a process that can fail to make sense, for example, if there is too much activity
no matter how far out one goes [Peebles, 1993, p. 139]. Without that qualification, local
conservation is not logically stronger than global conservation.
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was to be proven. This view also tends to overlook the locality of con-
servation laws and hence exaggerates the menace of non-conservation
(e.g., [Bunge, 1980, p. 17]); conservation can hold perfectly well in
astrophysics and refrigerators, even if interactionist dualism is true.
The conservation-affirming interactionist view also tends to overlook
the symmetry-conservation law link—why else would one work so hard
to establish consistency when it seems so unpromising?—and often de-
ploys a mistaken conception of conservation laws as primarily global
(not local) in an effort to uphold conservation through nonlocal com-
pensation. Nonlocal compensation amounts to trying to make up for
a violation in one place with a violation in another place, repeating
rather than mitigating the offense. The idea is unworkable in any case:
it is absurd that either there be another soul(s) elsewhere requiring
just the opposite amount of non-conservation (especially if souls are
libertarian-free) or that energy conservation fail somewhere with no
soul present.
It appears that only a minority of interactionist dualists in the
last century or so has been willing to let the conservation laws
fail, often with a partial awareness of the symmetry-conservation
link [Ducasse, 1960, Averill and Keating, 1981, Larmer, 1986,
Plantinga, 2007]. As it happens, this sort of view (naturally with less
grasp of the symmetry-conservation law link) was much more common
in the 18th century [Watkins, 1995a, Watkins, 1998, Pitts, 2020b]. In
the recent discussion, letting the conservation laws fail presumably
has seemed like a bridge too far for all but the heartiest of a priori
and/or religious metaphysicians, or the most informed about the
symmetry-conservation relation [Averill and Keating, 1981]. Surpris-
ingly enough, this view shows the best understanding of the relevant
theoretical physics. Whether it shows a good view of neuroscience is
of course a wholly separate question not addressed in this paper.
The failure of the argument from conservation laws against inter-
actionism has been previously noted by Jeremy Butterfield (partly
quoted as the epigraph):
This argument is flawed, for two reasons. The first rea-
son is obvious: who knows how small, or in some other
way hard to measure, these energy gains or losses in brains
might be? Agreed, this reason is weak: clearly, the onus is
on the interactionist to argue that they could be small, and
indeed are likely to be small. But the second reason is more
interesting, and returns us to the danger of assuming that
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physics is cumulative. Namely, the principle of the conser-
vation of energy is not sacrosanct. The principle was for-
mulated only in the mid-nineteenth century; and although
no violations have been established hitherto, it has been
seriously questioned on several occasions.. . . And, further-
more, it is not obeyed by a current relevant proposal. . . for
solving quantum theory’s measurement problem.
In short, physicalists need to be wary of bad reasons
to think physicalism is true, arising from naivety about
physics.
[Butterfield, 1997, pp. 146, 147]
When we recall that Newton and Euler were both at least implicitly
committed to accepting interactionism and letting the conservation
laws fail, it is less surprising when those well versed in physics today
also reject the Leibnizian argument.
7 Conservation Laws Are Local
One of the key features of conservation laws in modern physics is
that they are local [Lange, 2002, chapter 5]. The high school chem-
istry understanding of conservation laws, by contrast, apparently takes
conservation to be simply E = constant, a global conservation law.
While there is talk about energy flowing from one place to another,
there is rarely any suggestion that this flow is so disciplined as to
be described by one (differential) equation at each point in space, as
opposed to a single equation for the whole world. Expressed using
single-variable calculus (a good step towards a more modern view),
one can write the global conservation of energy E = constant equiv-
alently as dEdt = 0. Electromagnetism and gravitation were subsumed
into local field theory during the 1870s and the 1910s, respectively, re-
moving the examples of action at a distance and making conservation
in fundamental physics take much the same form that it had taken
since the mid-18th century for continuous media (fluids and solids).
Now energy and momentum are understood to have locations and
move at finite speeds.6
6Actually conservation laws in General Relativity has been controversial since the 1910s.
One can safely say that mathematical equations of the usual conservation form arise in
General Relativity due to symmetries of the laws, as in other theories. Whether one can
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A local conservation law says in effect that for each little volume,
the energy (or momentum or charge. . . ) in the volume changes only
insofar as energy (. . . ) flows through its boundary. Thus there is no
teleportation (whether instantaneous, at the speed of light, or at any
other pace), no disappearance into nothing, and no appearance out of
nothing. Mathematically one employs an energy density ρ(t, x) and an
energy current density ~J(t, x). A local conservation law takes the form
∂ρ(t,x)
∂t
+~∇·~J(t, x) = 0 at each place and time: the rate of increase of the
energy per unit volume at a given place and time, and the tendency
of energy to spew out of that place and time (the “divergence” of
the current density), together add up to 0. Thus if the energy per







energy must be getting sucked in (negative divergence) rather than
spewed out there and then: ~∇ · ~J(t, x) < 0. The two terms must have
opposite signs in order to add up to 0. This equation is called the
continuity equation. Introducing the universal quantifier ∀ (for all) to






+ ~∇ · ~J(t, x) = 0
]
.
This quantified equation is like a continuous conjunction of conserva-
tions in all the different places and times. The continuity equation,
with detailed expressions for ρ and ~J derived from the Lagrangian
in question, is the conservation in the symmetry-conservation mutual
implication of Noether’s first theorem.
If one uses the more expressively adequate component notation























Component notation generalizes more readily to General Relativity,
in which one faces a choice between the continuity equation for-
mally describing exact conservation of a partly mysterious combi-
nation (material energy + gravitational (pseudo-?) energy) and the
elegant 4-dimensional vector/tensor character that lets one convert
interpret the results realistically is a more difficult question. Fortunately, that question
does not need resolution here, though it will be discussed further below.
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freely between components relative to coordinate basis and coordinate-
independent bold-faced symbols, arrows with magnitude and direc-
tion, etc. [Anderson, 1967]. In component notation, one can express
either the continuity equation (which employs a gravitational energy-
momentum “pseudotensor,” which is difficult to interpret due to var-
ious real or alleged vices) or a tensorial equation that represents a
balance law rather than a conservation law. Thus the component no-
tation does not prejudge the content. In more elegant notation with
bold-faced symbols, one can naturally express only the balance law,
not the conservation law. One would need a good reason to abandon
the conservation law, a reason which in my opinion at least does not
exist.
8 Gentle Failure of Conservation Laws
Writing out the logical form of a local conservation law in terms of
quantifiers is useful because it helps to illustrate a form of robust-
ness, in contrast to the catastrophe that Bunge fears. One knows
that the negation of a conjunction is the disjunction of negations:
¬(A&B) ↔ (¬A ∨ ¬B). Universal quantification is like a huge con-
junction, while existential quantification is like a huge disjunction.
Thus the negation of a universally quantified statement (in this case
the continuity equation) tells us that conservation fails somewhere at
some time, perhaps at many time-places. This claim can be made












+ ~∇ · ~J 6= 0
]
.
Here the negation of an equality has been rendered as an inequality,
which seems defensible if interpreted sympathetically; it is possible,
however, that the mathematical expressions simply fail to make sense
and hence fail to justify an inequality. Hence the interactionist wants
to say that conservation holds in most times and places, but fails in a
few, namely, where souls act on brains. This claim is easier to express
in ordinary English than in formal logic.
If conservation fails somewhere sometime, that is not nearly as
frightening as if it failed everywhere all the time. Note that without
the explicit quantifiers, one might think that the failure of the conser-




















6= 0 means nonconservation everywhere and
always. (Perhaps that is the catastrophe that Bunge feared.) For-
tunately such a conclusion would be logically fallacious, as is clear
once the quantifiers are made explicit. Non-conservation in brains,
though surprising, would not threaten the thermodynamics of refrig-
erators or astrophysics. While the use of quantifiers might suggest
the academic level of a university-level formal logic course, that is not
correct. One can easily understand, for example, that if a box isn’t
brown and large, then it might be brown and not large, or large and
not brown, or neither brown nor large. If something isn’t true ev-
erywhere and always, then it is false (at least) somewhere sometime.
Much as there was no need for introducing the continuity equation
and its concomitant mathematics of multi-variable differential calcu-
lus for expressing the basic idea of the continuity equation, there is no
need for introducing quantificational logic to point out that the failure
of conservation might be a quite isolated affair rather than a global
catastrophe. Clearly such ideas are within reach at the secondary
school level.
Note also that if conservation laws fail somewhere sometime, it
might be the case that this failure is very small: only a little bit
of energy comes into being or disappears on account, e.g., of the
soul’s influence. Newton’s laws of reasoning, we recall from above,
allowed for mathematical relations that are only approximate. Vari-
ous 19th century authors entertained the possibility that a slight de-
viation from conservation might suffice for mind-to-body causation
[van Strien, 2015]. If nonconservation is sufficiently small in magni-
tude, or occurs only in places where one does not look, it might go
undetected. This is yet another way that Bunge’s catastrophe could
fail to occur.
9 Symmetries Imply Conservation
Laws & vice versa
Philosophers and others have discussed the idea of the natural world’s
being unaffected by anything else under a few different terms. In
the 19th century the “uniformity of nature” was a popular topic in
relation to the foundations of geology and in relation to inductive in-
ference. There is also talk about open vs. closed systems, especially in
relation to closed systems. Nowadays physicists and philosophers of
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physics talk about “symmetries” [Brading and Castellani, 2003], es-
pecially but not only symmetries of the Lagrangian density, a math-
ematical function of the physical fields and their rates of change.
In classical field theory, the fields’ equations of motion can be de-
rived from the Lagrangian density. In the path integral approach
to quantum field theory, the Lagrangian density is again the start-
ing point. The uniformity of nature (in time and place) picks out
some of the key symmetries that might hold for a Lagrangian den-
sity. In that respect, at least as long as a Lagrangian density is
the right place to start physical theorizing, the benefits of talking
about uniformities of nature are retained by talking about symme-
tries. 19th century results about the relationship between symmetries
and conservation laws [Lagrange, 1811, Hamilton, 1834, Jacobi, 1996]
were generalized and synthesized by Max Born and then Emmy
Noether during the 1910s [Born, 1914, Noether, 1918]. Born noted
that for theories of continua (field theories), conservation of energy
and of momentum hold when the Lagrangian density is indepen-
dent of time and of place, respectively. Noether proved a more
general result that includes Born’s result, along with a converse:
conservation laws imply symmetries. Contrapositively, one could
say that non-symmetry implies non-conservation. The symmetry-
conservation link runs in both directions: symmetry ↔ conservation
law [Noether, 1918, Brading, 2001, Kosmann-Schwarzbach, 2011].
A disadvantage of talk about open vs. closed systems is that it is
not obvious how these terms apply when one is considering the possi-
bility of immaterial influences. If I have a soul that acts on my brain,
is the physical world still a closed system? While the interaction-
ist might say “no,” the answer is somewhat less clear given the fairly
common view (albeit contested both a few centuries back and recently
[Grant, 1981, Pasnau, 2011, Pitts, 2019]) that spirits are not spatially
located. If there is no soul in my brain, isn’t that enough for applying
conservation to my brain, saying that the amount of energy in my
brain or any part thereof is conserved except insofar as energy flows
through the boundaries? Occasionally one sees energy conservation in-
voked as an objection to miracles as well [Stoeger, 1995, Fales, 2010,
p. 13], though probably most people figure that a being said to create
the world ex nihilo is perfectly free to effect energy non-conservation.7
7Amusingly, some calculations of the energy of the universe in General Relativ-
ity give 0, so it isn’t obvious that creation ex nihilo, or for that matter evolution ex
nihilo, conflicts with global conservation [Tryon, 1973, Rosen, 1994, Johri et al., 1995,
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Few have shared Newton’s view that God’s omnipresence implies be-
ing located everywhere, so the absence of spirits from space is likely
a poor criterion for a closed system at least in the divine case. For-
tunately, questions about the location of spirits, finite or infinite, are
entirely irrelevant, if one talks about symmetries of the Lagrangian
density, or even about uniformities of nature, rather than open/closed
systems. Symmetry/uniformity talk puts the emphasis on where spir-
its act, not on where they are—which is highly desirable because the
location of spirits has been a difficult question from the Scholastics
onward. Thus it is clear that spirits acting on matter falsify sym-
metries/uniformities of nature in those space-time regions where the
spirits in question act (if they exist and act on the physical world, that
is). Hence spiritually speaking, spirit-to-matter causation implies an
open rather than a closed system, but talking about symmetries or
uniformities instead is greatly illuminating.
Given the symmetry-conservation law link, what, if anything, fol-
lows for the Leibnizian objection? If I have a soul that acts on my
brain, it does so on Earth during my life, not on Mars 100 years ago.
That soulish action on the physical world is akin to an externally ap-
plied potential, not to a physical entity with its own physical dynamics
described by its own terms in the Lagrangian density. One is familiar
with external potentials in modelling gravity as providing potential
energy mgz for a point mass at height z above the Earth (assuming z
is sufficiently small); that the point mass might generate gravity of its
own or set in motion the Earth and hence alter the Earth’s gravita-
tional field is not denied, but it is neglected mathematically. If gravity
is a real physical entity (which it is), then such a treatment is only
a frequently useful approximation in our circumstances, not a reflec-
tion of how gravity really is. On the other hand, the soul surely has
no physical dynamics. While its workings are presumably somehow
sensitive to the state of the physical world, and the soul presumably
somehow acts on the physical world (at least according to the view
under critique), the dynamics of the soul should involve beliefs and
desires, a space of reasons, not pushes and pulls, or pressures, energy
densities and momentum fluxes or other physical causes. I smell a hot
pizza (matter-to-spirit influence). I decide to walk toward the pizza,
pick up a piece, and eat it (a typical instance of belief-desire folk psy-
chology with spirit-to-matter interaction). The taste motivates me to
Banerjee and Sen, 1997, Thirring, 2003]. Local conservation is a more difficult question.
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eat some more pizza. Given interactionist dualism (which must be
assumed provisionally in order to generate a refutation from energy
conservation), the physical world’s evolution is punctuated by influ-
ence from an immaterial realm not describable by Lagrangian field
theory, though the influence itself presumably is so describable. Thus
the physical equations of motion involve the mind’s influence as an
external potential depending on time and place, analogy to a particle
subject to gravity or a particle in an electromagnetic field (textbook
physics problems). Consequently energy conservation and momentum
conservation will not be true where and when the soul is acting.
Much as a particle in an applied gravitational field (that is, one
in which one neglects the sources and dynamics) can fail to conserve
momentum, one can have time-dependent Lagrangians in a biologi-
cal context.8 Now two issues arise: neglecting for the dynamics of
the environment (which causes the dependence on time) and distin-
guishing between fundamental vs. higher-level descriptions. Clearly
there is nothing surprising about a time-dependent Lagrangian due
to the dynamics of the environment; one might simply be uninter-
ested in anything more than its influence on the system in question.
Then the system’s energy is not conserved, but presumably the dy-
namics of the system plus environment, should one bother to consider
it, would conserve energy (and momentum). But the disanalogy to
mind-body interaction is evident: whether one considers the dynamics
of the brain or the dynamics of the whole physical world, one still has
a time-dependent influence due to the influence of the non-physical
mind, which has no dynamical equations from a Lagrangian. This
point remains whether one envisages a description with the mind act-
ing on fundamental physical fields (electrons, electromagnetism, and
perhaps quarks, say) or a macroscopic description with the mind act-
ing on higher level entities (parts of the brain). Clearly the latter
description would be of more relevance to neuroscience, however.
10 Circularity of Conservation Ob-
jection
The trouble for the Leibnizian objection is the need to show why the
interactionist dualist should apply modus tollens rather than modus
8I thank a referee for mentioning this example.
20
ponens. The Leibnizian claims that there is some absurdity or refuta-
tion here. What is it? Why should the interactionist not simply accept
non-conservation as a consequence? Often one sees proponents of the
Leibnizian objection simply introducing the conservation of energy as
a premise. Isn’t the conservation of energy a Fact, one known since
the 19th century and taught in secondary school? If energy conser-
vation is a Fact, then the Leibnizian argument works. Like Leibniz,
physicalist philosophers of mind typically believe that physics cate-
gorically shows energy conservation. But in light of the discussion of
local conservation laws and the symmetry-conservation law relation-
ship, the conservation of energy in the times and places in question
is not a fact, but rather a tendentious assertion that has little or no
claim on the interactionist—little or no claim, that is, except insofar
as empirical study of the brain has licensed it. The fact that energy
is conserved in steam engines and refrigerators is highly relevant ev-
idence assuming that one formerly believed that souls act on steam
engines and refrigerators. But no one has ever thought that. Thus
introducing the conservation of energy as a premise simply begs the
question against interactionist dualism.
As Aristotle pointed out in the Posterior Analytics, premises in a
scientific demonstration must be better known than and prior to the
conclusion [Smith, 2015]. Similar criteria are appropriate for mak-
ing an argument that ought to change someone’s mind. But given
Noether’s theorem and converse, symmetries and conservation laws
are equally well known, and neither is prior. The claim that souls act
on bodies clearly violates symmetries: my decision to eat pizza now
affects my brain now, not the Sun years ago. With symmetries failing
where and when my soul acts on my brain, the conservation of energy
and momentum fail in my brain.
How should an interactionist respond? A common bad re-
ply is denial that conservation is violated [Broad, 1937, Gibb, 2010,
White, 2017]. This denial is presumably motivated by the belief that
conservation laws are categorical, so that the Leibnizian objection
would be potent if conservation failed. But given local conservation
laws and the two-way relation between symmetries and conservation
laws, conservation indeed does fail. So this response is not available.
But it is also by no means clear why the physically well-informed
interactionist should want to avoid this conclusion.
A better answer is, “yeah, nonconservation, so what?” A suffi-
ciently small non-conservation that happens sufficiently rarely and
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in places that have not been carefully examined is not absurd on
physical grounds. One should try to do the philosophy of real
physics, not the philosophy of A-level chemistry, to generalize an
old warning [Ladyman et al., 2007, p. 24]. The conditionality of
conservation has been noted occasionally in the last century or so
[Ducasse, 1960, Averill and Keating, 1981, Larmer, 1986, Lowe, 1992,
Plantinga, 2007], but little heeded. What has been missing, presum-
ably, is a sufficiently detailed treatment to show that this view is
not a reactionary claim by religious or a priori metaphysicians insuffi-
ciently acquainted with science (as many seem to have believed—recall
the Dennett, Bunge and Churchland quotations above), but rather
a clear consequence modern physics (apart from General Relativity)
[Pitts, 2019, Cucu and Pitts, 2019, Pitts, 2020a]. The conditionality
of conservation was also the view of many of the best minds in cen-
turies past, including Descartes (likely), Newton (likely), Knutzen,
Crusius, Euler (likely), and Maxwell (sometimes) [Garber, 1983,
Watkins, 1995a, Watkins, 1998, van Strien, 2015, Pitts, 2020b]. On
closer investigation, Dennett’s “initial allegiance . . . to the physical
sciences” [Dennett, 1994] does not actually pay off in diagnosing an
“inescapable and fatal flaw” of dualism using quite standard physics.
Rejecting the Leibnizian conservation objection does not, of course,
imply that one takes interactionist dualism to be true or even plau-
sible. What does follow (apart from General Relativity) is that
any decent argument will be empirical and will involve neuroscience
[Thompson, 2008]. If there exist scientists who have the evidence
against interactionism, those experts are neuroscientists, not physi-
cists.
11 What Difference Does General
Relativity Make?
Thus far I have paid little attention to an elephant in the room,
namely, the 100+-year controversy over the status of energy and con-
servation in General Relativity. One can find well-informed people
who deny that there are conservation laws in General Relativity. One
can also find people who say that while distorting Noether’s (first) the-
orem. I will start with some mathematical facts that, in my opinion,
are some of the most important things to say about the subject.
When Max Born noted that the absence of t, x, y, or z from the
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Lagrangian density of a local field theory implies a conservation law
[Born, 1914], he made a statement of even broader applicability than
he perhaps intended given his context of special relativistic field the-
ories. His statement is true even for non-relativistic field theories and
for General Relativity as well [Bergmann, 1958, Goldstein, 1980, p.
555]. (Einstein seemed not to notice this, because he worked hard to
show conservation by some other means and wrote that “Grossmann &
I believed that the conservation laws were not satisfied” [Pitts, 2016].)
Whereas the rigid translations yielding conservation in Special Rela-
tivity are described by a finite number of parameters, in General Rel-
ativity one has infinitely many due to four arbitrary functions worth
of coordinate freedom. In effect one can apply Noether’s first theorem
in infinitely many different ways, getting results bearing no simple re-
lationship. (One person’s definition of sitting still and waiting (time
translation) is someone else’s definition of wiggling around a bit.) Tra-
ditionally this fact has been interpreted as counting against the objec-
tive localization or gravitational energy [Misner et al., 1973, p. 467] or
perhaps even against its reality due to having incompatible properties
[Hoefer, 2000, Duerr, 2019]; another possible interpretation is that the
different symmetries pick out different energies [Pitts, 2010]. Noether
[Noether, 1918] also showed that the total energy-momentum in Gen-
eral Relativity, unlike earlier theories, consists of a term proportional
to the field equations for gravity only and a “curl” term with auto-
matically vanishing divergence. More familiar theories would have an
additional nonzero term giving the value of the conserved quantities
and would have terms relating to the field equations for all of the fields,
not just the gravitational field. Is conservation missing or trivial in
General Relativity? Some have concluded so.
Given the Noether-based connection between symmetries and con-
servation laws, it seems to me an odd interpretive move to say that a
theory withmore symmetries of the Lagrangian density has fewer con-
servation laws, or even no or only trivial conservation laws. Noether’s
(first) theorem yields infinitely many conserved currents. What are
the usual objections to these quantities? One of the two main ob-
jections is that the gravitational energy term is pseudotensorial, not
tensorial: the gravitational energy at a point depends in a radical way
on the coordinate system, with no translation scheme (transformation
rule) relating pseudotensor values in different coordinate systems. A
common interpretation is that formal gravitational energy is generated
or destroyed simply by a changed labelling of space-time, so such ex-
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pressions should not be interpreted realistically. Instead gravitational
energy is “not localizable.” A second objection is that there is a rad-
ical non-uniqueness of the gravitational pseudotensor, some standard
examples belonging to Einstein, Papapetrou, Landau-Lifshitz, etc.
If one finds these objections impressive (and many or most peo-
ple have), then one still faces the mathematical fact that there exist
formal conserved currents arising from symmetries of the Lagrangian
density (not the geometry) involving (formally) rigid translations
in accord with Noether’s first theorem, much as in earlier theories
[Schmutzer, 1972]. The equations do not disappear or become false
by virtue of failing to meet some interpretive criteria. These currents
take the form
√−gT µν +










√−gtµν ) = 0.
In these respects gravitational (pseudo-) energy is just like the energy













√−gT µαΓαµν = 0,
where the Christoffel symbols Γαµν depend on the metric tensor and
its first derivatives. This latter equation generally cannot be inte-
grated to yield constant energy and constant momentum (even with
favorable boundary conditions) due to the second term [Weyl, 1922,
pp. 236, 269-271] [Misner et al., 1973, p. 465] [Lord, 1976, p. 139].
Hence the sum of material energy + gravitational (pseudo-?) en-
ergy is locally conserved and (if boundary conditions permit) glob-
ally conserved, while material energy usually is not locally or glob-
ally conserved. Clearly the gravitational (pseudo-?) energy expres-
sion
√−gtµν looks, walks and quacks in many respects like energy;
are these respects sufficient to interpret it as energy? (Recently the
reality of gravitational energy in at least some contexts has been de-
fended on functionalist grounds [Read, 2020].) The typical physics
textbook view is that one should not take the local conservation in-
volving
√−gT µν +
√−gtµν seriously, but one should take seriously the
spatially integrated conservation law when boundary conditions per-
mit, thus also picking out a small collection of contingently physically
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preferred coordinates [Misner et al., 1973]. This orthodoxy has seen
increased resistance in recent decades, however. How does gravita-
tional energy manage to be objectively nowhere in particular while
having a superabundance of local descriptions and also good global
behavior?
A common confusion is to consider symmetries of the space-time
geometry as required for conservation laws. For theories prior to
General Relativity, this requirement is reasonable. But Noether’s
theorem, which applies even to General Relativity, looks for sym-
metries of the Lagrangian density, not symmetries of the geometry
[Noether, 1918, Trautman, 1966]. The point is that the space-time
metric in General Relativity has its own field equations and hence is
relevantly similar to matter; thus the metric does not need to have
symmetries in order for Noether’s theorem to find symmetries and
conservation laws.
Confusion on this point (a complaint that the metric lacks
“motions,” that is, Killing vector fields, symmetries) lay at
or near the root of a high-profile gravitational heresy led
by Soviet/Russian Academician A. A. Logunov for decades
([Logunov and Folomeshkin, 1977, Denisov and Logunov, 1982],
critiqued [Faddeev, 1982, Zel’dovich and Grishchuk, 1986,
Zel’dovich and Grishchuk, 1988]). Robert Gentry’s complaints
about nonconservation as an absurdity of Big Bang cosmology
are analogous [Gentry, 1998, Gentry and Gentry, 1998] (critiqued
[Pitts, 2004a, Pitts, 2004b]).
Other authors similarly think that symmetries of the geometry (as
opposed to the Lagrangian density) are needed for conservation laws,
but interpret the inferred lack of conservation laws as a feature of Gen-
eral Relativity, or at least as an acceptable consequence, rather than
a bug [Motl, 2010, Hossenfelder, 2016, Physics Stack Exchange, 2017,
Hossenfelder, 2018, Siegel, 2018, Maudlin et al., 2020]. But Noether’s
theorem has no concept or role for geometry or symmetries thereof:
there are only fields in the Lagrangian density and symmetries of the
Lagrangian density. Thus General Relativity really does have Noether-
based conservation laws, albeit with unfamiliar and in some respects
unattractive qualities. Carroll, while preferring the nonconservation
view and showing no clarity about Noether’s theorem, regards the
topic as a matter of interpretive choice [Carroll, 2010].
The idea that General Relativity lacks conservation laws might
lead one to expect various consequences that are in fact very ques-
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tionable. Besides above-cited claims that this lack yields a refuta-
tion of the theory, one also finds authors who exploit the supposed
nonconservation as a resource for energy non-conserving processes.
Russell Humphreys claimed that this non-conservation was a resource
for creation science to dispose of heat from accelerated nuclear decay
[Humphreys, 2000] (critiqued [Pitts, 2009b]).
More relevant to present purposes is the invocation of this claimed
non-conservation to respond to Leibniz’s conservation objection to
interactionist dualism [Mohrhoff, 1997, Collins, 2008, Collins, 2011].
Unfortunately this claim does not work: for pre-General Relativis-
tic theories this answer is unnecessary (the symmetry-conservation
link sufficing to show the question-begging character of Leibniz’s ob-
jection), but for General Relativity it is false [Pitts, 2020a]. As one
can demonstrate using the Bianchi identities, thus avoiding questions
of interpreting pseudotensors, General Relativity has some tendency
(though not all that much) to resist the introduction of external influ-
ences, unlike earlier theories. One can show that Einstein’s equations
force up to four scalar fields worth of would-be mental causation to
vanish; at that point the resistance is broken. If one believes that
General Relativity conserves energy, one can interpret this claim in
terms of a strengthened neo-Leibnzian energy conservation objection,
one that doesn’t so obviously beg the question. Those who interpret
General Relativity as not conserving energy can still use the Bianchi
identities to draw this conclusion. The fact that the non-conservation
interpretation’s heuristic force is directly opposed to the actual math-
ematics should be noted, however.
The two traditional objections to pseudotensors are less com-
pelling now than they were over 20 years ago. According to James
Nester and collaborators, the non-uniqueness problem is a feature
rather than a bug: the different pseudotensors all have physical mean-
ing in relation to different boundary conditions [Chang et al., 1999,
Chang et al., 2000, Nester, 2004]. One can interpret the coordinate-
dependence of pseudotensors as the kind of property needed in order to
represent the infinity of conserved energies [Pitts, 2010, Pitts, 2009a]
that must exist to correspond to the infinity [Bergmann, 1958] of sym-
metries of the Lagrangian density. If a 10- or 16-component expression
for gravitational energy had a transformation rule to show the equiv-
alence of the values in different coordinate systems, then only one
energy would be expressed, not infinitely many as is required. Coor-
dinate systems are somewhat analogous to natural languages; tensor
26
calculus is akin to publishing every book translated into every lan-
guage, whereas a pseudotensor as akin to publishing Shakespeare in
English, Goethe in German, etc., using far less paper to express the
same ideas to a sufficiently capable reader. These two infinities (from
nonuniqueness and coordinate dependence) might turn out to be the
same infinity:
. . . the totality of all conservation laws C¯ρ,ρ= 0 in one coor-
dinate system is equivalent to one of them, stated in terms
of all conceivable coordinate systems. [Bergmann, 1958]
In light of the infinity of rigid symmetries, one infinity is desirable.
Hence the door is less closed than it once seemed regarding taking the
Noether pseudotensor mathematics seriously.
What can one say about energy conservation and General Rela-
tivity to a secondary school audience? Clearly the locality of energy
conservation still holds mathematically, though there are questions
of interpretation. Whereas pre-General Relativistic theories passively
accept non-uniform external influences due to the if-and-only-if rela-
tion between symmetries and conservation laws, General Relativity
has some tendency to exclude such influences, although not a very
strong one.
12 How To Improve Secondary Edu-
cation about Conservation Laws
The views that most non-academics and probably most philosophers
have about conservation laws seem to be largely based on secondary
school chemistry. The mathematics involved in providing a proper
statement of conservation laws, which are local, involves multi-variable
differential calculus to describe how quantities vary with time while
leaving place alone, or vary with location in the x-direction at constant
time and constant y- and z-coordinates. Such mathematics tends to
be learned (at least in the American system, which is familiar to me) in
the second year of an undergraduate education in engineering, math-
ematics, or physical science, but likely is not learned at all if one spe-
cializes in another subject. The most basic features of the symmetry-
conservation law relation tend to be learned in the third year of an
American undergraduate education in physics using a mechanics book
like Marion and Thornton [Marion and Thornton, 1988]. Most of the
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machinery appears in graduate-level physics [Goldstein, 1980, chapter
12], if one encounters it in coursework at all. Such material is not
and should not be part of a standard philosopher’s education. Hence
neither locality nor (bi)conditionality of symmetries is likely to be
widely known among philosophers (but see [Lange, 2002, chapter 5]).
It therefore isn’t necessarily anyone’s fault that philosophers build ar-
guments around an inadequate understanding of conservation laws.
It is natural to assume that one’s secondary school science education
would be refined and extended, and perhaps subtly amended, but not
fundamentally contradicted by university-level or even graduate-level
study.
Unfortunately the line between subtle amendment and fundamen-
tal contradiction is unsustainable given the exacting uses that some
philosophers aim to make of conservation laws. Is the following claim
a subtle amendment to or a fundamental contradiction of the lesson
from secondary school chemistry? “Conservation holds exactly almost
everywhere and always, but suffers small failures at times in the brains
of living persons and perhaps higher animals.” One might think that
the quoted claim is a subtle amendment of the secondary school chem-
istry story. But the quoted claim is useless for a Leibnizian argument.
The Leibnizian argument makes use of conservation in a way that is
not robust or stable in something like the physical sense; under small
perturbations, the argument goes away. Is the claim in quotation
marks true? That is primarily an empirical question—one answered
by looking not at steam engines or laboratory flasks or thigh muscles,
but at the brains of the beings in question.
While Lagrangian local field theory and the continuity equation are
likely to remain outside the education of most philosophers and are
certainly out of reach for secondary school chemistry classes, ordinary
language approximate paraphrases are certainly possible. Here is an
approximate paraphrase of the locality of conservation:
Energy is located in particular places, and conservation is
primordially local. Energy does not disappear in one place
and reappear in another, or simply disappear, or simply ap-
pear; it only moves around. The amount of energy in some
region changes only to the degree that energy flows into or
out of the boundaries of the region. In some contexts, it
is possible to add up all the conservation laws describing
how energy moves around and infer that the total amount
of energy in the universe remains constant. But cosmology
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suggests that one cannot do that in the real world.
This statement clearly does not require university-level mathematics
in the form of multi-variable differential calculus to state or under-
stand. An approximate paraphrase of the symmetry-conservation law
link, neglecting locality at this stage, might go like this:
Energy is conserved if and only if the laws are uniform over
time. Momentum is conserved if any only if the laws are
uniform across space.
Putting locality and the symmetry-conservation law link together, one
might say this:
Energy is conserved at a given time and place if and only if
the laws there and then do not vary with time. Momentum
is conserved at a given time and place if and only if the
laws there and then do not vary with place.
These approximate paraphrases admittedly do not carry the full
content of the exact statement (at least neglecting quantum physics)












Here T νµ applies to all physical fields together; gravity is not singled
out for special treatment. This quantitative statement also implies,
for example, that a weak explicit dependence of the Lagrangian den-
sity on time implies a little energy non-conservation, whereas a strong
explicit dependence of the Lagrangian density on time implies a lot of
energy non-conservation. But the approximate paraphrases do carry
far more content than is generally conveyed in secondary school chem-
istry and enough to understand the failure of Leibniz’s objection due
to begging the question. The equation also shows that symmetries
and conservation laws can be patchy, applying in most but not all of
the world.
The difference made by General Relativity has been discussed
above.
13 Why Does It Matter?
There are a number of reasons, both truth-related and action-related,
for reforming secondary school teaching about the conservation of en-
29
ergy to become more accurate. First, for the sake of truth, one should
not confuse a philosophical thesis about the absence of spirit-to-matter
influence (perhaps supportable by arguments from a Spinoza or a
Hume) with a result of the physics of matter (perhaps supported by
work by a Joule or a Mayer). Some of the discoverers of energy con-
servation would agree.
Second, such confusion is likely to engender in some circles a wider
suspicion of science as embodying a naturalistic agenda. If ‘science
denial’ is presently considered problematic, then making shoddy ar-
guments in the name of science is not the way forward; rather such
arguments provide good reasons for denying claims marketed as sci-
entific. The Leibnizian objection, though marketed as scientific, is
indefensible, so making or facilitating this argument diminishes the
credibility of science. The interesting scientific evidence in the neigh-
borhood comes from neuroscience, not thermodynamics. General Rel-
ativity makes a difference, but this difference is on the cutting edge of
research and hence perhaps in need of seasoning before popularization.
Third, intensified suspicion of claims marketed as scientific will
also retard significant action taken regarding climate change. To ef-
fect such change, especially in the United States—a place where there
exists an unusually strong combination of popular resistance to scien-
tific authority and large-scale combustion of fossil fuels—science and
science teaching must be seen as fact-based rather than as philosophi-
cally tendentious. This paper has discussed an opportunity for further
improvement.
Fourth, regarding the history of science, reforming teaching on
conservation laws makes it easier to understand what some 19th
century proponents of conservation laws (who in some cases made
exceptions for Creative Power, for example) were saying and were
not saying. Thus one can see the highly non-trivial innovation
proposed by Helmholtz in 1861 that was not in his earlier work
[von Helmholtz, 1847, von Helmholtz, 1861].
14 Acknowledgments
The author thanks grant collaborators Tim Crane (Cambridge, then
Central European University Budapest/Vienna), Jeremy Butterfield
(Trinity College, Cambridge), and Sam Newlands (Notre Dame). This
work was funded by the John Templeton Foundation grant #60745.
30
Thanks are also due to Steffen Ducheyne for information about New-
ton and the reference to Dempsey and to Martin Mattmu¨ller for help
with Euler’s works, and to the organizers of the special session, Paulo
Maur´ıcio and Raffaele Pisano. All views are my own.
The author has no conflict of interest.
References
[Alexander, 1956] Alexander, H. G., editor (1956). The Leibniz-
Clarke Correspondence. Manchester University, Manchester.
[Anderson, 1967] Anderson, J. L. (1967). Principles of Relativity
Physics. Academic, New York.
[Arana, 1994] Arana, J. (1993 (1994)). Los cient´ıficos de la Ilustracio´n
como apologistas del Cristianismo: Albrecht von Haller y Leonhard
Euler. Fragmentos de Filosof´ıa, (3):7–21.
[Averill and Keating, 1981] Averill, E. and Keating, B. F. (1981).
Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics? Mind: A
Quarterly Review of Philosophy, 90:102–107.
[Banerjee and Sen, 1997] Banerjee, N. and Sen, S. (1997). Einstein
pseudotensor and total energy of the universe. Pramana, Journal
of Physics, 49:609–615.
[Bergmann, 1958] Bergmann, P. G. (1958). Conservation laws in
general relativity as the generators of coordinate transformations.
Physical Review, 112:287–289.
[Born, 1914] Born, M. (1914). Der Impuls-Energie-Satz in der Elek-
trodynamik von Gustav Mie. Nachrichten von der Ko¨niglichen
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Go¨ttingen, Mathematisch-
Physikalische Klasse, pages 23–36. Translated as “The Momentum-
Energy Law in the Electrodynamics of Gustav Mie” in Ju¨rgen Renn
and Matthias Schemmel, editors, The Genesis of General Relativ-
ity, Volume 4: Gravitation in the Twilight of Classical Physics: The
Promise of Mathematics, Springer, Dordrecht (2007), pp. 745-756.
[Brading, 2001] Brading, K. (2001). Symmetries, Conservation Laws,
and Noether’s Variational Problem. PhD thesis, University of Ox-
ford. Supervisor Harvey Brown.
[Brading and Castellani, 2003] Brading, K. and Castellani, E., editors
(2003). Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
31
[Breidert, 2007] Breidert, W. (2007). Leonhard Euler and philosophy.
In Bradley, R. E. and Sandifer, C. E., editors, Leonhard Euler: Life,
Work and Legacy, volume 5 of Studies in the History and Philosophy
of Mathematics, pages 97–108. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
[Broad, 1937] Broad, C. D. (1937). The Mind and its Place in Nature.
Tarner Lectures, Trinity College, Cambridge, 1923. Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner and Co., London.
[Broad, 1953] Broad, C. D. (1953). Religion, Philosophy and Psychi-
cal Research: Selected Essays. Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited,
London.
[Broad, 1962] Broad, C. D. (1962). Lectures on Psychical Research:
Incorporating the Perrott Lectures Given in Cambridge University
in 1959 and 1960. Humanities Press, New York.
[Broman, 2012] Broman, T. (2012). Metaphysics for an enlightened
public: The controversy over monads in Germany, 1746-1748. Isis,
103:1–23.
[Bunge, 1980] Bunge, M. (1980). The Mind-Body Problem: A Psy-
chobiological Approach. Pergamon, Oxford.
[Butterfield, 1997] Butterfield, J. (1997). Quantum curiosities of
psychophysics. In Cornwell, J., editor, Consciousness and Hu-
man Identity, pages 122–159. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/193/.
[Cahan, 2012] Cahan, D. (2012). The awarding of the Copley Medal
and the discovery of the law of conservation of energy: Joule, Mayer
and Helmholtz revisited. Notes and Records of the Royal Society,
66:125–139.
[Calinger, 2016] Calinger, R. S. (2016). Leonhard Euler: Mathe-
matical Genius in the Enlightenment. Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
[Carroll, 2010] Carroll, S. (2010). Energy is not conserved. Dis-
cover: The Magazine of Science, Technology and the Future.
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2010/02/22/energy-
is-not-conserved/#.WaAUO2d3FyA.
[Chang et al., 1999] Chang, C.-C., Nester, J. M., and Chen, C.-M.
(1999). Pseudotensors and quasilocal energy-momentum. Physical
Review Letters, 83:1897–1901. gr-qc/9809040.
32
[Chang et al., 2000] Chang, C.-C., Nester, J. M., and Chen, C.-M.
(2000). Energy-momentum (Quasi-)Localization for gravitating sys-
tems. In Liu, L., Luo, J., Li, X.-Z., and Hsu, J.-P., editors, The
Proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Gravitation
and Astrophysics: Beijing Normal University, China, October 10-
15, 1999, pages 163–173. World Scientific, Singapore. arXiv:gr-
qc/9912058v1.
[Chang, 2013] Chang, H. (2013). Thermal physics and thermodynam-
ics. In Buchwald, J. Z. and Fox, R., editors, The Oxford Handbook
of the History of Physics, pages 473–507. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
[Churchland, 2011] Churchland, P. M. (2011). Consciousness and the
introspection of qualitative simples. Eidos, 15:12–47.
[Clarke, 1727] Clarke, S. (1727). A letter from the Rev. Dr. Samuel
Clarke to Mr. Benjamin Hoadly, F. R. S. occasion’d by the present
Controversy among Mathematicians concerning the proportion of
Velocity and Force in Bodies in Motion. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society of London, 35:381–388.
[Collins, 2008] Collins, R. (2008). Modern physics and the energy-
conservation objection to mind-body dualism. American Philosoph-
ical Quarterly, 45:31–42.
[Collins, 2011] Collins, R. (2011). The energy of the soul. In Baker,
M. C. and Goetz, S., editors, The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations
into the Existence of the Soul, pages 123–133. Continuum, New
York.
[Crane, 2001] Crane, T. (2001). Elements of Mind: An Introduction
to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[Cucu and Pitts, 2019] Cucu, A. C. and Pitts, J. B. (2019). How dual-
ists should (not) respond to the objection from energy conservation.
Mind and Matter, 17:95–121.
[Daston, 1982] Daston, L. J. (1982). The theory of will versus the
science of mind. In Woodward, W. R. and Ash, M. G., editors, The
Problematic Science: Psychology In Nineteenth-Century Thought,
Praeger Special Studies, pages 88–115. Praeger Scientific.
[Dempsey, 2006] Dempsey, L. (2006). Written in the flesh: Isaac New-
ton on the mind-body relation. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part A, 37:420–441.
33
[Denisov and Logunov, 1982] Denisov, V. I. and Logunov, A. A.
(1982). The inertial mass defined in the general theory of relativity
has no physical meaning. Theoretical and Mathematical Physics,
51:421–426.
[Dennett, 1991] Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little,
Brown and Co., Boston.
[Dennett, 1994] Dennett, D. C. (1994). Dennett, Daniel C. In Gutten-
plan, S., editor, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell
Companions to Philosophy, pages 236–244. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
[Drozdek, 2010] Drozdek, A. (2010). Leonhard Euler as an apologist.
Theologische Zeitschrift, 66:62–82.
[Ducasse, 1960] Ducasse, C. (1960). In defense of dualism. In Hook,
S., editor, Dimensions of Mind: A Symposium, pages 85–90. New
York University Press, New York.
[Duerr, 2019] Duerr, P. M. (2019). Fantastic beasts and where (not)
to find them: Local gravitational energy and energy conservation
in general relativity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics, 65:1–14.
[Euler, 1746] Euler, L. (1746). De la force de percussion
et de sa veritable mesure (1745). Memoirs de l’Academie
Royale des Sciences et des Belles Lettres de Berlin, pages
21–53. Opera Omnia Series 2, Volume 8, pp. 27 - 53;
http://eulerarchive.maa.org/pages/E082.html.
[Euler, 1752] Euler, L. (1750/1752). Recherches sur
l’origine des forces. Histoire de l’Acadmie Royale




[Euler, 1757] Euler, L. (1757). Principes ge´ne´raux du mouvement des
fluides (1755). Me´moires de l’Acade´mie des Sciences de Berlin,
11:274–315. Reprinted in Opera Omnia Series 2, Volume 12, pp. 54-
91; http://eulerarchive.maa.org//pages/E226.html; translated as
“General principles of the motion of fluids” by Thomas E. Burton
and U. Frisch, Physica D 237 (2008) pp. 1825-1839.
[Euler, 1840] Euler, L. (1840). Letters of Euler on Different Sub-
jects in Natural Philosophy: Addressed to a German Princess; with
34
Notes, and a Life of Euler, by David Brewster. Harper, New York.
Translated by Henry Hunter, French original 1768.
[Euler, 1926] Euler, L. (1926). Dissertatio physica de sono (E002,
Physical dissertation on sound, 1727). In Bernoulli, E., Bernoulli,
R., Rudio, F., and Speiser, A., editors, Opera Omnia, volume 1,
Commentationes physicae: ad physicam generalem et ad theoriam
soni pertinentes of 3, Opera physica, miscellanea, epistolae, pages
183–196. http://eulerarchive.maa.org/, translated and annotated
by Ian Bruce.
[Euler, 1965] Euler, L. (1965). Rettung der Go¨ttlichen Offenbahrung
gegen die Einwu¨rfe der Freygeister. In Speiser, A., Trost, E.,
and Blanc, C., editors, Leonhardi Euleri Opera Omnia, vol-
ume 12 of 3, pages 267–286. Societatis Scientiarum Naturalium
Helveticae, Zurich. 1747; French and English translations at
http://eulerarchive.maa.org/tour/tour 17.html, document E92.
[Faddeev, 1982] Faddeev, L. D. (1982). The energy problem in Ein-
stein’s theory of gravitation (dedicated to the memory of V. A.
Fock). Soviet Physics Uspekhi, 25:130–142.
[Fales, 2010] Fales, E. (2010). Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and
Epistemological Puzzles. Routledge, New York.
[Flanagan, 1991] Flanagan, O. (1991). The Science of the Mind. MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, second edition.
[Fodor, 1998] Fodor, J. (1998). The mind-body problem. In Arnold,
N. S., Benditt, T. M., and Graham, G., editors, Philosophy
Then and Now, pages 63–77. Blackwell, Malden, Massachusetts.
Reprinted from Scientific American, January 1981, pp. 114-123.
[Gale, Jr., 1973] Gale, Jr., G. (1973). Leibniz’ dynamical meta-
physics and the origins of the vis viva controversy. Sys-
tematics, 11(3):205. http://www.systematics.org/journal/vol11-
3/Leibniz Dynamical Metaphysics.pdf.
[Garber, 1983] Garber, D. (1983). Mind, body, and the laws of nature
in Descartes and Leibniz. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 8:105–134.
[Gentry, 1998] Gentry, R. V. (1998). The new redshift interpretation
affirmed. arxiv.org/pdf/physics/9810051.
[Gentry and Gentry, 1998] Gentry, R. V. and Gentry, D. W. (1998).
The genuine cosmic rosetta. arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9806061.
35
[Gibb, 2010] Gibb, S. (2010). Closure principles and the laws of con-
servation of energy and momentum. Dialectica, 64:363–384.
[Goldstein, 1980] Goldstein, H. (1980). Classical Mechanics. Addison-
Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, second edition.
[Grant, 1981] Grant, E. (1981). Much Ado about Nothing: Theories
of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revo-
lution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[Hamilton, 1834] Hamilton, W. R. (1834). On a general method in
dynamics; by which the study of the motions of all free systems of
attracting or repelling points is reduced to the search and differen-
tiation of one central relation, or characteristic function. Philosoph-
ical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 124:247–308.
[Hankins, 1965] Hankins, T. L. (1965). Eighteenth-century attempts
to resolve the Vis viva controversy. Isis, 56:281–297.
[Heidelberger, 2004] Heidelberger, M. (2004). Nature from Within:
Gustav Theodor Fechner and His Psychophysical Worldview. Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
[Heimann, 1977] Heimann, P. M. (1977). “Geometry and nature”:
Leibniz and Johann Bernoulli’s theory of motion. Centaurus, 21:1–
26.
[Hoefer, 2000] Hoefer, C. (2000). Energy conservation in GTR. Stud-
ies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 31:187–199.
[Hossenfelder, 2018] Hossenfelder, S. (Monday, July 30, 2018). 10
physics facts you should have learned in school but probably didn’t.
BackReAction. http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2018/07/10-
physics-facts-you-should-have.html.
[Hossenfelder, 2016] Hossenfelder, S. (Wednesday, Octo-
ber 19, 2016). Dear Dr B: Where does dark energy
come from and what’s it made of? BackReAction.
http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2016/10/dear-dr-b-where-
does-dark-energy-come.html.
[Hugens, 1669] Hugens, C. (1669). A summary account of the Laws of
Motion, communicated by Mr. Christian Hugens in a letter to the
R. Society, and since printed in French in the Journal des Scavans
of March 18. 1669. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society,
4:925–928.
36
[Humphreys, 2000] Humphreys, D. R. (2000). Accelerated nuclear de-
cay: A viable hypothesis? In Vardiman, L., Snelling, A. A., and
Chaffin, E. F., editors, Radioisotopes and the Age of the Earth: A
Young-Earth Creationist Research Initiative, volume 1, pages 333–
379. Institute for Creation Research, El Cajon, California, and Cre-
ation Research Society, St. Joseph, Missouri.
[Iltis, 1970] Iltis, C. (1970). D’Alembert and the vis viva controversy.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 1:135–144.
[Iltis, 1971] Iltis, C. (1971). Leibniz and the vis viva controversy. Isis,
62:21–35.
[Jackson, 1975] Jackson, J. D. (1975). Classical Electrodynamics. Wi-
ley, New York, second edition.
[Jacobi, 1996] Jacobi, C. G. J. (1996). Vorlesungen u¨ber analytis-
che Mechanik, Berlin 1847/8. Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung.
Vieweg, Braunschweig. Edited by Helmut Pulte.
[Johri et al., 1995] Johri, V. B., Kalligas, D., Singh, G. P., and
Everitt, C. W. F. (1995). Gravitational energy in the expanding
universe. General Relativity and Gravitation, 27:313–318.
[Joule, 1845] Joule, J. P. (1845). On the existence of an equivalent
relation between heat and the ordinary forms of mechanical power.
The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and
Journal of Science, 27:205–207.
[Joule, 1846] Joule, J. P. (1846). On the mechanical equivalent of
heat. Report of the Fifteenth Meeting of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science; Held at Cambridge in June 1845,
(Chemical Section):31.
[Joule, 1850] Joule, J. P. (1850). On the mechanical equivalent of
heat. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London,
140:61–82.
[Knobloch, 2010] Knobloch, E. (2010). Leonhard Euler als Theo-
retiker. In Bredekamp, H. and Velminski, W., editors, Mathesis
& Graphe´: Leonhard Euler und die Entfaltung der Wissensysteme,
pages 19–36. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
[Knobloch, 2018] Knobloch, E. (2018). Euler and d’Alembert—
Brothers only in mind: Their relation to the Prussian King Freder-
ick II and the Russian Empress Catherine II. Acta Baltica Historiae
et Philosophiae Scientiarum, 6(2):106–126.
37
[Kosmann-Schwarzbach, 2011] Kosmann-Schwarzbach, Y. (2011).
The Noether Theorems: Invariance and Conservation Laws in the
Twentieth Century. Springer, New York. Translated by Bertram E.
Schwarzbach.
[Kuhn, 1959] Kuhn, T. S. (1959). Energy conservation as an example
of simultaneous discovery. In Clagett, M., editor, Critical Problems
in the History of Science, pages 321–356. University of Wisconsin
Press, Madison.
[Ladyman et al., 2007] Ladyman, J., Ross, D., Spurrett, D., and Col-
lier, J. (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[Lagrange, 1811] Lagrange, J.-L. (1811). Me´canique Analytique, vol-
ume 1. Courcier, Paris, revised edition. Google Books.
[Lange, 2002] Lange, M. (2002). An Introduction to The Philosophy
of Physics: Locality, Fields, Energy, and Mass. John Wiley & Sons,
Malden, Massachusetts.
[Larmer, 1986] Larmer, R. (1986). Mind-body interaction and the
conservation of energy. International Philosophical Quarterly,
26:277–285.
[Laudan, 1968] Laudan, L. L. (1968). The Vis viva controversy, a
post-mortem. Isis, 59:130–143.
[Leibniz, 1969] Leibniz, G. W. (1969). Considerations on vital prin-
ciples and plastic natures, by the author of the system of pre-
established harmony, 1705. In Loemker, L. E., editor, Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, pages 586–591.
D. Reidel, Dordrecht, second edition.
[Leibniz, 1981] Leibniz, G. W. (1981). New Essays on Human Under-
standing. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Translated and
edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett.
[Leibniz, 1985] Leibniz, G. W. (1985). Theodicy: Essays on the Good-
ness of God and the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil. Open
Court, La Salle, Illinois. Translator E. M. Huggard.
[Leibniz, 1997] Leibniz, G. W. (1997). [First] Explanation of the New
System of the Communication between Substances, in reply to what
was said of it in the Journal for 12 September 1695. In Woolhouse,
R. S. and Francks, R., editors, Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Asso-
ciated Contemporary Texts, pages 47–52. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Original April 1696.
38
[Logunov and Folomeshkin, 1977] Logunov, A. A. and Folomeshkin,
V. N. (1977). The energy-momentum problem and the theory of
gravitation. Theoretical and Mathematical Physics, 32:749–771.
[Lord, 1976] Lord, E. A. (1976). Tensors, Relativity and Cosmology.
Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., New Delhi.
[Lowe, 1992] Lowe, E. J. (1992). The problem of psychophysical cau-
sation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70:263–276.
[Lowe, 2003] Lowe, E. J. (2003). Physical causal closure and the in-
visibility of mental causation. In Walter, S. and Heckmann, H.-D.,
editors, Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of
Mind and Action, pages 137–154. Imprint Academic, Exeter.
[Lycan, 2009] Lycan, W. G. (2009). Giving dualism its due. Aus-
tralasian Journal of Philosophy, 87:551–563.
[Lycan, 2011] Lycan, W. G. (2011). Recent naturalistic dualisms. In
Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Reli-
gion and the Contemporary World, pages 348–363. Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, Go¨ttingen.
[Lycan, 2013] Lycan, W. G. (2013). Is property dualism better off
than substance dualism? Philosophical Studies, 164:533–542.
[Lycan, 2018] Lycan, W. G. (2018). Redressing substance dualism.
In Loose, J. J., Menuge, A. J. L., and Moreland, J. P., editors, The
Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, pages 22–39. Wiley
Blackwell, Oxford.
[Marion and Thornton, 1988] Marion, J. B. and Thornton, S. T.
(1988). Classical Dynamics of Particles & Systems. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, San Diego, third edition.
[Marshall, 1982] Marshall, M. E. (1982). Physics, metaphysics, and
Fechner’s psychophysics. In Woodward, W. R. and Ash, M. G., ed-
itors, The Problematic Science: Psychology In Nineteenth-Century
Thought, Praeger Special Studies, pages 65–87. Praeger Scientific.
[Maudlin et al., 2020] Maudlin, T., Okon, E., and Sudarsky, D.
(2020). On the status of conservation laws in physics: Implica-
tions for semiclassical gravity. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics, 69:67–81. arXiv:1910.06473v1 [gr-qc].
[McGinn, 1999] McGinn, C. (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Con-
scious Minds in a Material World. Basic Books, New York.
39
[McGuire, 1968] McGuire, J. E. (1968). Force, active principles, and
Newton’s invisible realm. Ambix, 15:154–208.
[Misner et al., 1973] Misner, C., Thorne, K., and Wheeler, J. A.
(1973). Gravitation. Freeman, New York.
[Mohrhoff, 1997] Mohrhoff, U. (1997). Interactionism, energy conser-
vation, and the violation of physical laws. Physics Essays, 10:651–
665.
[Montero, 2006] Montero, B. (2006). What does the conservation of
energy have to do with physicalism? Dialectica, 60:383–396.
[Morowitz, 1987] Morowitz, H. J. (1987). The mind body problem
and the second law of thermodynamics. Biology and Philosophy,
2:271–275.
[Motl, 2010] Motl, L. (August 11, 2010). Why and how
energy is not conserved in cosmology. The Reference
Frame. https://motls.blogspot.com/2010/08/why-and-how-energy-
is-not-conserved-in.html?m=1.
[Nester, 2004] Nester, J. M. (2004). General pseudotensors and
quasilocal quantities. Classical and Quantum Gravity, 21:S261–
S280.
[Newton, 1999] Newton, I. (1999). The Principia: Mathematical
Principles of Natural Philosophy. University of California Press,
Berkeley. Translated by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman and
Julia Budenz, with a Guide by I. Bernard Cohen.
[Noether, 1918] Noether, E. (1918). Invariante Variationsprobleme.
Nachrichten der Ko¨niglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu
Go¨ttingen, Mathematisch-Physikalische Klasse, pages 235–257.
Translated as “Invariant Variation Problems” by M. A. Tavel,
Transport Theory and Statistical Physics 1 pp. 183-207 (1971), La-
TeXed by Frank Y. Wang, arXiv:physics/0503066 [physics.hist-ph].
[Papineau, 1977] Papineau, D. (1977). The Vis Viva controversy: Do
meanings matter? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,
8:111–142.
[Pasnau, 2011] Pasnau, R. (2011). Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671.
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
[Peebles, 1993] Peebles, P. J. E. (1993). Principles of Physical Cos-
mology. Princeton University, Princeton.
40
[Physics Stack Exchange, 2017] Physics Stack Exchange (2017).
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/333489/conservation-
of-energy-in-general-relativity.
[Pitts, 2004a] Pitts, J. B. (2004a). Has Robert Gentry refuted Big
Bang cosmology? On energy conservation and cosmic expan-
sion. Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 56(4):260–265.
http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2004/PSCF12-04Pitts.pdf.
[Pitts, 2004b] Pitts, J. B. (2004b). Reply to Gentry on cosmological
energy conservation and cosmic expansion. Perspectives on Science
and Christian Faith, 56(4):278–284.
[Pitts, 2009a] Pitts, J. B. (2009a). Gauge-invariant localization of in-
finitely many gravitational energies from all possible auxiliary struc-
tures, or, why pseudotensors are okay. Proceedings of the DPF-2009
Conference, Division of Particles and Fields, American Physical So-
ciety, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan; arXiv:0910.3320
[hep-th].
[Pitts, 2009b] Pitts, J. B. (2009b). Nonexistence of Humphreys’
“volume cooling” for terrestrial heat disposal by cosmic expan-
sion. Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith, 61(1):23–28.
http://www.asa3.org/asa/pscf/2009/PSCF3-09Pitts.pdf.
[Pitts, 2010] Pitts, J. B. (2010). Gauge-invariant localization of in-
finitely many gravitational energies from all possible auxiliary struc-
tures. General Relativity and Gravitation, 42:601–622. 0902.1288
[gr-qc].
[Pitts, 2016] Pitts, J. B. (2016). Einstein’s physical strategy, en-
ergy conservation, symmetries, and stability: “but Grossmann &
I believed that the conservation laws were not satisfied”. Studies
in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 54:52–72. PhilSci;
arxiv.org/1604.03038 [physics.hist-ph].
[Pitts, 2019] Pitts, J. B. (2019). Conservation laws and the philosophy
of mind: Opening the black box, finding a mirror. Philosophia.
doi:10.1007/s11406-019-00102-7.
[Pitts, 2020a] Pitts, J. B. (2020a). General relativity, mental causa-
tion, and energy conservation. Under review at Erkenntnis.
[Pitts, 2020b] Pitts, J. B. (2020b). The mind-body problem and con-
servation laws: The growth of physical understanding? Under
review at HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the
History of Philosophy of Science.
41
[Plantinga, 2007] Plantinga, A. (2007). Materialism and Christian
belief. In van Inwagen, P. and Zimmerman, D., editors, Persons:
Human and Divine, pages 99–141. Oxford University Press, New
York.
[Pollock, 1989] Pollock, J. L. (1989). How to Build a Person: A Pro-
legomenon. MIT Press, Cambridge.
[Priestly, 1777] Priestly, J. (1777). Disquisitions Relating to Matter
and Spirit. J. Johnson, London.
[Read, 2020] Read, J. (2020). Functional gravitational energy.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71:205–232.
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx048.
[Remnant, 1979] Remnant, P. (1979). Descartes: Body and soul.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 9:377–386.
[Rescher, 1991] Rescher, N., editor (1991). G. W. Leibniz’s Monadol-
ogy: An Edition for Students. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pitts-
burgh.
[Rey, 2018] Rey, A.-L. (2018). The experiments of Willem Jacob ’s
Gravesande: A validation of Leibnizian dynamics against Newton?
In Bodenmann, S., editor, What Does it Mean to be an Empiri-
cist? Empiricisms in Eighteenth Century Sciences, volume 331 of
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, pages 71–
85. Springer International Publishing, Cham, Switzerland.
[Rosen, 1994] Rosen, N. (1994). The energy of the universe. General
Relativity and Gravitation, 26:319–321.
[Schmaltz, 2008] Schmaltz, T. M. (2008). Descartes on Causation.
Oxford University Press, New York.
[Schmutzer, 1972] Schmutzer, E. (1972). Symmetrien und Erhal-
tungssa¨tze der Physik. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin.
[Searle, 2004] Searle, J. R. (2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford.
[Siegel, 2018] Siegel, E. (March 10, 2018). Ask Ethan: Where is the
line between mathematics and physics? Forbes: Starts with a Bang.
[Smith, 1998] Smith, C. (1998). The Science of Energy: A Cultural
History of Energy Physics in Victorian Britain. The Athlone Press,
London.
42
[Smith, 2006] Smith, G. E. (2006). The vis viva dispute: A contro-
versy at the dawn of dynamics. Physics Today, 59(10):31–36.
[Smith, 2015] Smith, R. (2015). Aristotle’s logic. In Zalta, E. N., edi-
tor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2015 edition.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/aristotle-
logic/.
[Stoeger, 1995] Stoeger, W. (1995). Describing God’s action in the
world in light of scientific knowledge of reality. In Russell, R. J.,
Murphy, N., and Peacocke, A., editors, Chaos and Complexity: Sci-
entific Perspectives on Divine Action, pages 239–261. Vatican Ob-
servatory Foundation and The Center for Theology and the Natural
Sciences, Notre Dame, Indiana.
[Terrall, 2004] Terrall, M. (2004). Vis Viva revisited. History of Sci-
ence, 42:189–209.
[Thirring, 2003] Thirring, W. E. (2003). God’s traces in the laws of
nature. In The Cultural Values of Science, pages 362–372. The
Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Vatican City.
[Thompson, 2008] Thompson, I. J. (2008). Discrete degrees within
and between nature and mind. In Antonietti, A., Corradini, A.,
and Lowe, J., editors, Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Inter-
disciplinary Approach, pages 99–123. Lexington Books, Lanham,
Maryland.
[Trautman, 1966] Trautman, A. (1966). The general theory of rela-
tivity. Soviet Physics Uspekhi, 9:319–339. Appendix by L. P. Gr-
ishchuk.
[Tryon, 1973] Tryon, E. P. (1973). Is the universe a vacuum fluctua-
tion? Nature, 246:396.
[van Inwagen, 2009] van Inwagen, P. (2009). Metaphysics. Westview
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, third edition.
[van Strien, 2015] van Strien, M. (2015). Vital instability: Life and
free will in physics and physiology, 1860-1880. Annals of Science,
72:381–400.
[von Helmholtz, 1847] von Helmholtz, H. (1847). U¨ber die Erhaltung
der Kraft. G. Reimer, Berlin. Translated in Russell Kahl, editor,
Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz, Wesleyan University
Press, Middletown, Connecticut (1971), pp. 3-55.
43
[von Helmholtz, 1861] von Helmholtz, H. (1861). On the application
of the law of conservation of force to organic nature. Proceedings of
the Royal Institution, 3(1858-1862):347–357. In Russell Kahl, ed-
itor, Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz, Wesleyan Uni-
versity Press, Middletown, Connecticut (1971), pp. 109-121.
[Wallis, 1668] Wallis, J. (1668). A summary account given by Dr.
John Wallis, of the general laws of motion, by way of letter writ-
ten by him to the publisher, and communicated to the R. Society,
Novemb. 26. 1668. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society
of London, 3:864–866.
[Watkins, 1995a] Watkins, E. (1995a). The development of physical
influx in early eighteenth-century Germany: Gottsched, Knutzen,
and Crusius. Review of Metaphysics, 49:295–339.
[Watkins, 1995b] Watkins, E. (1995b). Kant’s theory of physical in-
flux. Archiv fu¨r Geschichte der Philosophie, 77:285–324.
[Watkins, 1998] Watkins, E. (1998). From pre-established harmony to
physical influx: Leibniz’s reception in eighteenth century Germany.
Perspectives on Science, 6:136–203.
[Wegener, 2009] Wegener, F. D. A. (2009). A True Pro-
teus: A History of Energy Conservation in German Science
and Culture, 1847-1914. PhD thesis, Universiteit Utrecht.
https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/36626.
[Westphal, 2016] Westphal, J. (2016). The Mind-Body Problem. MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[Weyl, 1922] Weyl, H. (1922). Space-Time-Matter. Methuen & Com-
pany, London. Translated by Henry L. Brose from 4th edition of
Raum-Zeit-Materie; reprinted by Dover, New York (1952).
[White, 2017] White, B. (2017). Conservation laws and inter-
actionist dualism. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67:387–405.
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw054.
[Woolhouse, 1986] Woolhouse, R. S. (1985-1986). Leibniz’s reaction
to Cartesian interaction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
86:69–82.
[Wren, 1668] Wren, C. (1668). Dr Christopher Wrens theory concern-
ing the same Subject; imparted to the Royal Society Decemb. 17
last, though entertain’d by the author divers years ago, and veri-
fied by many Experiments, made by Himself and that other excel-
lent Mathematician M. Rook before the said Society, as is attested
44
by many Worthy Members of that Illustrious Body. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 3:867–868.
[Young, 2015] Young, J. (2015). Heat, work, and subtle fluids: a
commentary on Joule (1850) ‘on the mechanical equivalent of heat’.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical,
Physical and Engineering Sciences, 373(20140348).
[Zel’dovich and Grishchuk, 1986] Zel’dovich, Y. B. and Grishchuk,
L. P. (1986). Gravitation, the general theory of relativity, and al-
ternative theories. Soviet Physics Uspekhi, 29:780–787.
[Zel’dovich and Grishchuk, 1988] Zel’dovich, Y. B. and Grishchuk,
L. P. (1988). The general theory of relativity is correct! Soviet
Physics Uspekhi, 31:666.
[Zimmerman, 2007] Zimmerman, D. (2007). Dualism in the philoso-
phy of mind. In Borchert, D. M., editor, Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
pages 113–122. Macmillan, New York, second edition. http://fas-
philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmerman/Dualism.in.Mind.pdf.
45
